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Back in October 2022, when Rishi Sunak took over as British prime minister, he became the fifth consecutive British prime minister to occupy the role over a six-year span.

Triggered in the UK by Brexit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So how might we describe what is unfolding in France, now on its sixth prime minister in two years – with three in the last ten months?

The latest prime minister, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in return for opposition Socialist votes as the price for his administration's continuation.

But it is, at best, a temporary fix. The EU’s number two economic power is trapped in a ongoing governmental crisis, the scale of which it has not experienced for many years – possibly not since the establishment of its Fifth French Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no easy escape.

Minority Rule

Key background: from the moment Macron called an ill-advised snap general election in 2024, France has had a hung parliament split into three warring blocs – left, the far right and his own centrist coalition – without any group holding a clear majority.

At the same time, the nation faces twin financial emergencies: its debt-to-GDP ratio and deficit are now nearly double the EU limit, and hard constitutional deadlines to approve a 2026 budget that at least begins to rein in spending are approaching.

Against that unforgiving backdrop, both the prime ministers before Lecornu – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.

In September, the president appointed his trusted associate Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu presented his government team – which proved to be much the same as the old one – he faced fury from allies and opponents alike.

To such an extent that the next day, he stepped down. After just 27 days in office, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in recent French history. In a dignified speech, he cited political rigidity, saying “partisan attitudes” and “personal ambitions” would make his job all but impossible.

Another twist in the tale: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for two more days in a last-ditch effort to secure multi-party support – a task, to put it gently, not without complications.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs publicly turned on the embattled president. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI refused to meet Lecornu, vowing to reject all future administrations unless there were snap elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the end of his 48 hours, he appeared on television to say he believed “a path still existed” to prevent a vote. The leader's team confirmed the president would appoint a new prime minister 48 hours later.

Macron kept his promise – and on that Friday appointed … Sébastien Lecornu, again. So this week – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the country’s rival political parties were “fuelling division” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Would he endure – and is he able to approve the crucial budget?

In a critical address, the young prime minister outlined his financial plans, giving the centre-left Socialist party (PS), who detest Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were expecting: Macron’s flagship reform would be suspended until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already supportive, the Socialists said they would refuse to support censorship votes tabled against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the administration would likely endure those votes, scheduled for Thursday.

It is, however, by no means certain to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS explicitly warned that it would be seeking more concessions. “This,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”

Changing Political Culture

The problem is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, like the PS, the conservatives are themselves split on dealing with the administration – some are still itching to topple it.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how difficult his mission – and future viability – will be. A combined 264 lawmakers from the RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and hardline-right UDR want him out.

To achieve that, they need a majority of 288 votes in parliament – so if they can persuade just 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in 24 months is, like his predecessors, toast.

Most expect this to occur soon. Although, by some miracle, the divided parliament summons up the collective responsibility to pass a budget by year-end, the prospects for the government beyond that look grim.

So does an exit exist? Snap elections would be unlikely to solve the problem: surveys indicate pretty much every party bar the RN would see reduced representation, but there would remain no decisive majority. A new prime minister would face the same intractable arithmetic.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to step down. After a presidential vote, his replacement would dissolve parliament and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But that, too, is uncertain.

Polls suggest the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that French electorate, having elected a far-right president, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.

Ultimately, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its leaders acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that decisive majorities are a thing of the past, absolute victory is obsolete, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.

Numerous observers believe that transformation will not be feasible under the existing governmental framework. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and actively discourages – the formation of ruling alliances typical across Europe. The Fifth Republic could be in its final stage.”